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RESTRICTED
THE HERITAGE OF TYRE
A lecture delivered by

Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, U. S. N.
at the Naval War College
December 17, 1948

Since man first sat astride a floating log and propelled
himself with a piece of driftwood, the waterways have served
not only as frontiers but as areas of conflict and avenues of in
tercourse between peoples. It is, for instance, the ocean routes and
not the impassable land barriers between them which truly .join
North and South America. The same was true in the old world.
The Mediterranean, though separating three continents, was the
chief means of contact, conflict and the spread of the civilization
which grew up along its shores. Here trade, piracy, and organ
ized sea warfare seemed to have flourished from pre-historic times.
The first great seafaring people were apparently the
Cretans or Minoans, but Phoenicia with her great port of Tyre was
the first maritime nation of which we know the history. Phoeni
cian ships more than 12 centuries before Christ were receiving
the wealth of the East, and distributing it along the shores of the
Mediterranean. It is hard to overstress the importance of these
early mariners as builders of civilization. The venturesome ex
plorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port not only
opened up a new source of wealth for himself but also quickened
civilization at both ends of his route. The cargo ships that left
the Nile Delta distributed the arts of Egypt as well as her wheat.
Greece, was the next nation after Phoenicia to become a
sea power, and her great victory over Xerxes navy at Salamis was
Admiral Brown is Chief of Staff to the President, Naval War Col
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what really ended the menace of Persia on European soil. Upon
its issue depended the Golden Age of Athens which reached its
flower in the 80 years following, and which could hardly have come
had Greece fallen under the demoralizing influence of oriental
rule. Salamis was therefore a victory not only for Greece but for
all of mankind.
Two centuries elapsed between the Greek victory at Salamis
and the Punic Wars, a second great struggle between alien races
for Mediterranean control. Here again it can be said that the wel:
fare of mankind rode with victory in that struggle. Compared
with the culture of Rome, with its law, engineering and ideals of
practical efficiency, the civilization of Carthage was barren and
sterile.
Carthage, herself a Phoenician colony, had centuries of ex
perience in seafaring and sea fighting while Rome was predomi
nantly a land power. But Rome was young, lean and hard while
Carthage was old, and ripe for plucking. So Rome took to the sea
and, after a long struggle, destroyed Carthaginian sea power.
Thus was Rome forced
then, in turn, became dominant
through sea power she gained
turies the Mediterranean was
nostrum ( our sea) •

reluctantly upon the sea. Rome
on every Mediterranean shore and,
the world. For the next six cen
to remain for the Romans mare

In the year 328 A. D., the Emperor Constantine the Great
shifted his capitol from Rome to Byzantium now known as Is
tanbul but best known to us as Constantinople. It is a strange
commentary upon the indifference of us of the western world that
we could owe an incalculable debt to the eastern Roman Empire and
yet remain so ignorant on the subject. While Rome fell apart and
,
Europe broke up in chaos and descended into the Dark Ages, a single
citadel of western culture stood fast at Constantinople, a preserver
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of Christianity and the cultural heritage of Greece and Rome, as
well as a civilizing influence upon slavic people to the northward.
For a period of over 700 years, a time longer than from her final
fall in 1453 until today, Byzantium alone stayed the westward
sweep of Mohammedanism under first the Saracen and then the
Turk until the weak states of Europe could grow strong enough
to finally halt the sons of the prophet at the gates of Vienna.
Again, it is a story of the East against the West, of the struggle
of alien peoples for the Mediterranean. And it is a story of sea
power.
During her 1000 years of life, Byzantium stood firm only as
long as she kept hold on the sea. Each time she failed to do this
her strength dwindled until at last she had shrunk to a mere city
fortress the doom of which was assured long before it fell. The
Turks finally took Constantinople after a brief siege of seven
weeks.
The resulting Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean was
the direct cause of the great voyages of discovery. Blocked by
the Turks fro.m the old caravan trade routes to China, the West
turned toward the open sea to seek Cathay west across the At
lantic· and south around Africa.

,,

The rise of Portugal was a spectacular phenomenon of the
Age of Discovery. Her intrepid navigators rounded Africa to
open a sea. route to the Indies and made Portugal the richest nation in Europe, with a great colonial empire and claims to dominion
over half the seas of the world. But the Portuguese system of
colonial administration or rather exploitation, was even worse than
Spain's and. Portugal fell back into the ranks of lesser states.
The rise and fall of Spain is a tragic parallel of Portugal's.
As Portugal first turned south and east, Spain was to go westward
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to Mexico and Peru to carry her pillage and her conquest. From
the ancient Aztec and Inca empires Spain was to wring the gold
and silver with which to finance the next centuries of wars, wars
whose outcomes were to give racial, religious, and political form
to the world in which we live. But Spain, too, was to fail due to
many causes which may be roughly summed up as a lack of mari
time genius.
Next it was Holland whose turn it was to flash dramatically
across the pages of history. Her rise to wealth and power was a
tribute to Dutch character, integrity, hard-headed business sense
and native maritime genius, for it was the sea alone which gave
Holland an avenue to greatness. Her fall came after she had spent
herself against the maritime strength of England.
France too was to make her bid for sea -power and French
naval history is a story of promise· alternating with· disappoint
ment. The French navy has known periods of great glory and, in its
lowest estate, never dishonored the military reputation so dear to •
that nation. Yet as a maritime nation, France has never held more
than a respectable position.
Some peculiar quirk of national character seemed to color the
naval strategy of France. Her officers sought to economize their
fleet, to use it in commerce warfare rather than in battle. Even
when fortune favored France, she lost golden opportunities due
to this fatal weakness which corrupted her officers. The English
officer, on the contrary, sought out the enemy and took the of
fe:nsive, retrieving many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer
hard hitting.
This brings us to England where we will pick up the threads
of our story and tie them together, for the true story of modern
sea power until aft�r the turn of this the 20th century has been
the history of England. While others rose to shine but briefly
36
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though often brilliantly, she was to climb steadily until she be
came the acknowledged mistress of the seas. This control of the
sea exercised by England was not the gift of fortune. It was a
prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in peace and hard fight
ing in war.
England first defeated the Spanish Navy, and then it was
Holland who must meet the challenge of the British Isles. There
followed three great wars in which the Dutch fought with epic
gallantry. But in the Third Dutch War France teamed up with
England, and Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Faced on
the land by France, the dominating military power, and on the sea
by the combined might of the British and French navies, all
seemed lost. And yet Holland was not defeated. She opened
her dikes to check the armies of invasion and, under her great
Admiral deRyder, fought the navies of France and England to a
standstill. When peace eventually came all honors were hers but
she was an exhausted and prostrate land, and Holland, like Spain,
settled back in slow decline.
This enmity of the French king for the Dutch which led him
to team up with the English had gained nothing for France and
everything for England. Unwittingly Louis XIV had built up the
only country that could become the greatest colonial and maritime
rival of France. A series of wars were now to blaze forth be
tween England and France with such frequency that the two na
tions were to remain at daggers' points for the next century and
a quarter.
Time permits only the barest mention of a few of these
wars, important though they be. In the Seven Years' War, the
British Fleet was to prove a priceless weapon. Teamed up with
Wolfe, that 18th century master of amphibious warfare, it was
37
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to wreck the French colonial Elmpire. The Seven Years' War
finally ended in terms of deepest humiliation to France. She was
compelled to renounce to England all of Canada ,the Ohio Valley and
the entire area east of the Mississippi, except the then sickly

little settlement at New Orleans.

No peace such as., that following the Seven Years' Wars
could be permanent. Every patriotic Frenchman burned with a
passion for revenge. The · opportunity came with the American
Revolution. From the outset France was unneutral and, after the
capture of Burgoyne, she decided to enter the war openly. It may
seem startingly to say, but the Revolutionary War was as much
naval as it was military.

Before the entry of France, the English

kept their army supplied by sea and forced Washington into the

cruel depths of Valley Forge. George Washington, himself, ac

knowledged it was the French Navy that really saved America.

And the final victory, which was assured when Cornwallis sur
rendered at Yorktown, came from a temporary loss of control of
Cornwallis' sea communications.

Ten years after the American Revolution British sea power

was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with

France following· the French Revolution. As the war dragged on,
Spain and Holland were to add their navies to that of France and

the rise of Bonaparte was to make France supreme on the Con
tinent. But the magnitude of these events on land during · which

Napoleon fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew king.,
doms, and remade the map of Europe, obscures the prime im
portance of the warfare that went on the sea. For it was Great
Britain by virtue of her navy and insular position that remained
Napoleon's least vulnerable and most obstinate opponent, forc
ing him to ever renewed and exhausting campaigns, reviving con
tinental opposition and supporting it with subsidies made possi
ble by control of sea trade.
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Finally, at Trafalgar, the English won a signal victory
against a much larger French fleet in what is universally ac
counted one of the decisive battles of the world. Napoleon who
had been planning an invasion of England faced his army back
towards the Continent saying: "It will be Britain that forces us
to conquer Europe." The great conqueror had set his feet .on
the path leading to Moscow and Waterloo.

It was in that same June of 1812 when Napoleon gath

ered his "army of twenty nations" for the Russian Campaign
that the United States declared war on Great Britain. The tiny

American Navy fought brilliantly but was inevitably smothered

by weight of numbers and the final peace settled none of the dif
ferences that had begun the war.
The remainder of the 19th century was to be a period of

relative peace thanks to the British naval predominance which
had broken the Napoleonic hegemony, stripped France of practi

cally all of her American possessions· and made . America north of
the Rio Grande English in speech, laws and traditions. The Union
blockade crippled the finances of the South, shut out munitions and
food stuffs, and was a major factor in the downfall of the Con

federacy. The Japanese defeat of the Chinese Navy in the Bat
tle of the Yalu in 1894, marked the emergence of Japan as a formid:

able force in international affairs and brought in a period of in
tensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far East. And
finally in 1898, the last sorry act was played out in dying Spanish
sea power. Spain was ignominously defeated in both the Battles
of Manila Bay and Santiago.
In 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke out in best Japan
ese tradition by a vicious attack without declaration of war. This
war was marked by two great Japanese naval victories; the first
off Port Arthur on August 10, 1904 and the second in Tsushima
Straits on the 27th of May, 1905.
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The Russo-Japanese War greatly weakened Russia's posi

tion in Europe, leaving the dual alliance of France and Russia out
weighed by that of Germany and Austria.

This upsetting of the

European balance of power coupled with Germany's commercial

rivalry and the growing might of the German navy forced Eng

land to abandon her neutral position in between and the First
World War was to find her on the side of France and Russia.

World War I was fundamentally akin to the Napoleonic

Wars, a struggle between land power predominant on the Contin
ent and naval power supreme on the seas.

was soon to make its strangling power felt.

The English blockade
As had the French

before them, the Germans retaliated with commerce raiding.

But

unlike France, Germany had the submarine, which was soon to
prove one of the greatest perils of the sea.

Its effective

ness was to be deeply underscored by the almost complete Eng
lish dependency upon the sea. The battle against the submarine
was finally won but the margin was dangerously close.

We need not concern ourselves too closely with the various

naval actions of the First World War.

The English fleet was to

keep the sea while the German fleet found it impossible to break

out through the steel ring of Britain.

However, we should briefly

review the one great naval battle of the war which was fought at

Jutland. Here England won at least a strategic victory but failed to

destroy the German fleet.

Had England won an epic victory, Jut

land would have marked the turning point of the war instead of
leading, in Churchill's own words, "Directly to the submarine peril
of 1917."

The German submarine campaign could never have at

tained the effectiveness it did.

But most important of all, Russia

could have been kept in the war.

For, paradoxically, the first
victim" of sea power in World War I was not Germany, but Eng-
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land's ally Russia who succumbed to the German Navy.

Ninety

percent of Russia's imports were cut off by the combined efforts

of the German navy, which blockaded the Baltic, and Germany's
Turkish ally who held the Dardanelles.

Russia suffered terrible

losses from the resulting lack of munitions, and this desperate plight

of Russia was the most compelling reason for the British Dardan
elles' Campaign.

Unfortunately, however;· the Campaign was a

tragic failure, and Russia fell' into ruins. ,
So much for the First World War.

The. Second World War,

with some justification, has been called a continuation of that First
World War which had .been interrupted by .a period of armed truc,e.

Certainly the twenty-five years which began in 1914, have the
qualities of a great .tragedy.

The League of Nations proved to

be an unhappy failure and the world was to watch .the clouds of

war grow ever more ominous.

France by her unwillingness to

make timely concessions to a moderate German government hasten

ed that government's fall which brough. t .into power the ele
ments of extreme dissatisfaction.

EnglB.Ild, disturbed. by French,

predominance, which overthrew
. the balance of, power, was not
.
•. . ,

,,

altogether unsympathetic towards a resurgent Germany.

Am�ri-

ca resolutely .turned .her back on the wprld, d�termined to regain

her historic isolation.

Germany, far from penitent, wished only

to correct mistakes which had somehow robbed her superior war

machine of the fruits of victory and. hoped yet to wrench rich
spoils from decadent :neighbors.

Japan: the most recent and most

irresponsible recruit to Imperialism, was determined to follow her

destiny towards a dream of world domination; while Italy, steeped
in nostalgic dreams of an ancient glory, skulked like a greedy
jackal in the trail of the jungle giants.

By 1933 it was evident that the three nations, Japan, Italy

and Germany, were set upon paths leading inevitably and fatally
to war.

Thereafter, events were to transpire with increasing fre-
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quericy which were to carry the whole world into another mortal

conflict.

It

was now too plain that the forces of aggression could
only be stopped by force, but out of an anarchy of compromise, a
policy of appeasement had been born and Germany's opponents
were to absorb even ruder shocks before their deep-rooted anti-war
sentiments could be overcome. Finally in 1938, the world saw

the supreme humiliation of England at Munich, and when on
September 1st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, England and
France, pushed beyond all limits, declared war two days later. The
Second World War had begun. Or had it begun in 1937 with the
Japanese invasion of China; or earlier still, in 1931, when Japan
invaded Manchuria? Indeed, had the troubled peace-begun by the

Armistice and unsolved by the vengeful treaty of Versailles
been other than an armed truce while nations realined and re

armed to continue the struggle to see which one could claw its
way to the top?
In the beginning German victories on the
with such clock-like regularity that, in less than
Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France
run. On the 22nd of June, 1940, France signed

Continent came
a year, Poland,
had been over
an humiliating

armistice which was to reduce her to virtual slavery throughout
the remainder of the war.

But across the Channel the British people seemed to sud
denly discover a new reservoir of power and confidence. The
Chamberlain government fell and behind the courageous and dy

namic leadership of Winston Churchill, the English rallied to show
a deathless courage,· a stamina and fortitude worthy · of English

men of any other age.

An outnumbered Royal Air Force fought
back the horde of German aircraft which, with increasing in

tensity throughout the summer, sought to drive it from the skies
as a prelude to invasion.
42
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Finally, defeated in the air over Britain, Germany was to
again turn to the Continent and the Balkan states were overrun
or forced into vassalage. Then on June the 22nd, 1941, Hitler,
like Napoleon before him, was to begin his fateful Russian ad
venture. For a while the German army swept all before it and,
in October and November, victory seemed imminent. Japan de
cided that time was ripe fot her complete entrance into a struggle
bidding fair to recarve the world into totalitarian empires and on
December 7, 1941, began war without warning by an air raid
against the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
What of sea power during this titanic struggle of land and
air warfare, which, in a little over two years, had swept across
the face of the earth?
This time a wiser Germany was able to soften the effects of
blockade by stockpiling, the development of synthetics, and through
conquest, the acquirement . of the stockpiles of neighboring states
and the incorporation into her economy of vast areas with their
sources of raw materials. Thus the negative effect of sea power's
denial of commerce was, temporarily at least, defeated; but Eng
land and her Allies were to continue to enjoy the positive boon
of huge imports throughout the duration of the war.
Germany, recognizing England's complete dependence on
the sea, was to bend every effort to accomplish what she had failed
to do before-sever the British lifeline. - The struggle was to be a
seesaw with the submarine finally going down in defeat, but again
the margin was dangerously close.
Later as America found her strength the sea was to supply a
crushing bomber offerisive and make possible a series of amphibious
operations which finally liberated• Europe and--·destroyed the Ger
man army. It was sea power which won at El Alamein and in the
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later North African invasion. It was the same story in Sicily and
in Italy when the foes of Germany were to return to the Continent
at last. And, again, it was the long arm of sea power that, in the
early dawn of June the 6th, 1944, supported the invasion of France
which was to set the final seal of bankruptcy on German strategy.
But it was in the Pacific that sea power more than ever was
to prove the handmaiden of victory. Fought across the largest
body of water in the world, an ocean only sparsely dotted with small
islands, the war in the Pacific was obviously from the start a naval
war., For no other reason, Japan's first and choice objective was
the American fleet.
You know the rest of the story as well as I. Japan received
her first check in the Coral Sea when a seaborne invasion aimed at
the capture of Port Moresby was forced to turn back. Then came
Midway. Many informed Japanese saw in Midway the turning
point of the war, and so calamitous were the results considered,
that the story was never announced in the homeland until after
final surrender.
Many famous battles were fought and many epic and gallant
deeds were done which have added rich pages to our history. I wish
I had the time to discuss them. But I must rest content by say
ing that the United States succeeded in welding land, sea and air
forces into an amphibious machine which moved amphibiously
across the most forbidding distances in the world and succeeded
in severing Japan from her sources of supply and provided the
bases and the logistic support required by the Air Force in its
great bomber offensive against Japan.
And so to sum up this little thumb nail sketch which covers
all of written history, we find that the prime importance of sea
power is clearly demonstrable from the days of Tyre until today.
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Sea power denies the enemy the sinews of war and provides them

for one's- self. Sea power permits us to carry war to the enemy
thus forcing him to fight at home where it hurts. This will also

ease our own defense requirements, for the enemy will
have to expend precious resources in defense that he might other
wise use in attacking us. Worse than that (from his point of view),
he will grow to live in constant dread of our landings and will have

to spread his forces so thin in order to protect himself in all di

rections that no matter how big his army and air force, he will

find they are never big enough.

For the choice of the point of at

tack is always given to that nation which controls the sea.

"But why seize and build these bases?" I am asked. "Cannot
our airplanes fly there, bomb the enemy, and then get back?"
No, they cannot; that is, none we have built yet can do it. Nor
do our scientists hold out any promise of airplanes that can do so

at any time soon. Of course we can refuel them in the air, but that
is an expensive way to do it. Besides fighters cannotgo along to

protect the bombers, and bombers must have their fighter cover.

But, even if we had super long-range bombers and fighters,
there is another compelling reason why we must have our bomber

bases close to the enemy. If we cut the distance a bomber must fly
in half, we multiply its effectiveness by four. If we cut the dis
tance down to one-fourth, we will multiply its effectiveness by

sixteen.

This old law of mathematics applies to all weapons, includ

ing the guided missile.

The day of the long range guided missile

is still many years -in the future but when it comes, navies will

still be needed to take it closer to the enemy so that we can enjoy

this enormous advantage of multiplying its effectiveness by many,
many fold.
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But what about the atomic bomb? Hasn't this changed the
whole complexion of war?
Of course it has. I would be the last to deprecate the terrible
potentialities of this weapon which can only be described in words
of horror. But nothing has changed our fundamental laws. The
way to win a war is still the same and will continue to be the same.
To be victorious war must be carried to the enemy. Atomic bombs
are tremendously expensive. The number will always be too limited
to waste any trying to hit a target thousands of miles away when
we have the means of getting much closer. Germany alone ab
sorbed the equivalent of 200 atomic bombs in the last war. Indeed
Mr. P. M., S. Plunkett, Nobel prize winner and famous physicist,
puts the number in the thousands, but choosing the lesser number,
we do not now have that many nor does it appear that we have
any expectation of ever having that many in the future. But, even
if we do, we must not waste them in a long range effort.
And so, in conclusion, we find that theface of the globe has
not changed, though many have chosen to ignore the continued
existence of the oceans and seas. Even the pictures in our mag
azines which so vividly portray the world as round are actually
misleading. They usually show the part of the world that is land.
They make us forget that three-fourths of the earth's surface is
covered by water, and only one-quarter by land.
New weapons and the increased efficiency of land, sea and
air transportation, have all served to complicate modern living, but
they have not changed the basic facts of life, either in peace or
war. The coming of age of air power as a decisive w:'eapon of
war, is of enormous and far reaching conseque_nces. I, as one who
has spent a quarter of a century in aviation, would be the last to
deprecate this fact. But the case for sea power was never so
strong as it is today. We can lose another war if we ever permit
ourselves to forget it.
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